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Abstract
In this article, I contribute to the debate between two philosophical traditions—the 
Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal responsibility and the 
grounds for excuse by taking this debate to a new context: international criminal law. 
After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of criminal responsibil-
ity, I defend a quasi-Aristotelian conception, which affords a central role to moral de-
velopment, and especially to the development of moral perception, for international 
criminal law. I show than an implication of this view is that persons who are substan-
tially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral perception warrant 
an excuse for engaging in unlawful conduct. I identify a particular set of conditions 
that trigger this excuse, and then I systematically examine it as applied to the contro-
versial case of former-child-soldier-turned leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Domi-
nic Ongwen, who is currently at trial at the International Criminal Court.
Keywords
criminal responsibility – international criminal law – virtue ethics – moral perception 
– child soldiers – International Criminal Court (icc) – Dominic Ongwen
1 Introduction
In recent decades, virtue ethicists have brought renewed attention to the 
importance of moral education of the emotions, and the capacity for moral 
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perception, to ethical life.1 This has also been seen in legal theory, particularly 
in recent theorising about criminal responsibility and excuse. Multiple schol-
ars have put forth what may be broadly described as Aristotelian accounts 
of criminal responsibility, in their efforts to challenge the more Kantian ap-
proaches to criminal responsibility that long dominated Anglo-American legal 
thought and practice.2 In this article, I contribute to the debate between Kan-
tian and Aristotelian camps by taking the discussion to a new domain, that 
of international criminal law. Specifically, I seek to show that the case for a 
quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility and excuse,3 which af-
fords a central role to moral development, and especially to the development 
of moral perception, is stronger on the international level than it, arguably, is 
on the domestic level.4
Under the quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility and ex-
cuse that I draw on in this article, a person is excused from criminal responsi-
bility if she lacked either the capacity or the fair opportunity to choose to obey 
the law, where this includes the capacity for practical reason, as well as certain 
moral capacities, and a fair opportunity exercise these capacities. One implica-
tion of this view is that certain forms of defective moral development ground 
an excuse from criminal responsibility for criminal conduct. One such excuse, 
which I call the ‘harmed moral perception excuse’, figures prominently in my 
article. I situate this excuse within the long tradition of virtue ethics begin-
ning with Aristotle, but I argue for it in a new context, that is, in the context of 
1 E.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999); Lau-
rence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004); Eve Rabinoff, Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 
IL, 2018). See also the work of Martha Nussbaum, who does not endorse the category of virtue 
ethics, but whose work nonetheless highlights the role of emotions similar to virtue ethicists: 
Martha Nussbaum, ‘Virtue ethics: a misleading category?’, 3(3) The Journal of Ethics (1999) 
163–201; Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2004).
2 Peter Arenella, ‘Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our 
Moral Culpability Judgments’, 7(2) Social Philosophy and Policy (1990) 59–83; Dan N. Kahan 
and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotions in Criminal Law’, 96(2) Columbia 
Law Review (1996) 269–374; John Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’, 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
(1998) 575–598; Kyron Huigens, ‘On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff ’, 18(2) Notre 
Dame Journal of Law & Public Policy (2004) 465–499.
3 I describe the view I defend as a ‘quasi’-Aristotelian account on the grounds that it does 
not offer a full account of virtue and does not consider virtue per se as central to criminal 
responsibility.
4 While I am largely persuaded by aspects of the Aristotelian view for domestic law, it is not 
my intention to argue directly for it in this article. For defences of the Aristotelian view for 
domestic law, see supra note 2.
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international criminal law. There is a strong case in favour of the harmed mor-
al perception excuse under international criminal law because international 
crimes are often carried out in the environment of armed conflict, which is 
known to burden the exercise of an ordinary person’s agential capacities of 
practical reason and moral perception, and because international crimes are 
fundamentally moral wrongs.
My argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 frames the analysis. I begin by 
describing the Kantian conception of criminal responsibility, which figured 
prominently in legal theory and practice until a renewed interest in virtue eth-
ics a few decades ago revived Aristotelian ideas (regarding the relevance of 
emotions, moral education, and character to ethical judgment) and integrated 
them into theories about criminal responsibility and excuse. Here, I present a 
quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility and excuse, which is 
anchored in a character conception of moral agency, but that identifies choice 
as the intentional object of criminal responsibility. Then I explain how this 
conception supports the harmed moral perception excuse. In Section 3, I argue 
for recognition of the harmed moral perception excuse under international 
criminal law, in light of the extraordinary environments in which interna-
tional crimes typically occur, and the moral nature of international crimes. In 
Section 4, I identify four conditions for the application of the harmed moral 
perception excuse, and a plausible application of it to the prominent contem-
porary case of Dominic Ongwen, the former-child-soldier-turned-leader of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (lra), who is currently on trial at the International 
Criminal Court (icc). Lastly, in Section 5, I summarise my argument, respond 
to a possible lingering objection, and offer concluding remarks.
2 Kantian versus Aristotelian Conceptions of Criminal Responsibility
What has been described as a Kantian approach to criminal responsibility 
stems from the philosophical tradition beginning with Augustine, which takes 
free will as the ultimate condition of responsible agency and finds a modern 
expression in the legal thought of H.L.A. Hart, as well as in some writings of 
contemporary legal theorist, Michael Moore. In his moral writings, Kant held 
that the will is the locus of our moral agency, and the moral worth of an action 
comes from the fact that is done out duty alone, and out of respect for the mor-
al law, unmixed by inclination.5 Human law, as Kant explains in the ‘Doctrine 
5 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie be-
cause of Philanthropic Concerns, James W. Ellington, trans., 3rd ed.(Hackett, Indianapolis/ 
Cambridge, 1993).
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of Right’ in Metaphysics of Morals, however, is distinct from the moral law, and 
its demands are primarily external.6 Human law does not demand conformity 
of the will with the law out of respect for the law, as does the moral law, but it 
demands conformity of conduct.7 This does not mean that the will is irrelevant 
to human law, however. While it does not really matter why we follow human 
law, it matters why we break it. For Kant, the criminal law implicitly recognises 
that our will may be overcome by the demanding nature of certain circum-
stances, and in such cases, we cannot justly be punished for acting contrary to 
the law.8
Scholars after Kant developed Kant’s ideas about the will, rationality, and 
autonomy to construct their own accounts of criminal responsibility and ex-
cuse. Hart argued that the excuses deal with the distribution of punishment, 
based on principles of justice and respect for individual autonomy.9 This led 
him to endorse the view of excuses that ‘what is crucial is that those whom we 
punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and 
mental, for abstaining from what [the law] forbids, and a fair opportunity to 
exercise these capacities’.10
In the context of a highly relevant debate between the Kantian and Ar-
istotelian camps in the 1990s, Moore further developed Hart’s view and put 
forth a version of what has been called the ‘choice theory’ of responsibility 
and excuse. Moore explained that Hart’s criteria in the above quotation con-
tains two requirements, one which concerns the ‘equipment’ of the actor, and 
the other which concerns his or her ‘situation’.11 In his examination of these 
6 Immanuel Kant, ‘Doctrine of Right’, in Mary Gregor (ed.), The Metaphysics of Morals 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996).
7 Allan Wood and Paul Guyer debate the relation between law and morality in Kant’s 
thought. See Allan Wood, ‘The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy’, in Mark Tim-
mons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2002), pp. 1–22; Paul Guyer, ‘Kant’s Deductions of the Principles of Right’, in 
Mark Timmons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York, 2002), pp. 23–64.
8 In ‘Doctrine of Right’, supra note 6, Kant writes the following of a shipwrecked man who 
throws another man overboard to save his life: ‘An act of violent self-preservation, then, 
ought not to be considered as altogether beyond condemnation (inculpabile); it is only to 
be adjudged as exempt from punishment (impunibile)’, p. 28.
9 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’, 60 Proceedings of the Aristo-
telian Society (1959–1960) 1–26.
10 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays on the Philosophy of Law (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York, 2008), p. 152.
11 Michael Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’, 7(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 
(1990) 554.
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requirements, Moore held the following claims also to be true: the capacity for 
choice under the criminal law is made possible by practical reason, emotions 
do not incapacitate choice,12 and though it may be more difficult for persons 
to choose to obey the law if they cannot do so for moral reasons, they are not 
deprived of the fair opportunity to choose to do so by virtue of this difficulty.13
In an influential essay on emotion and criminal law, Dan Kahan and Martha 
Nussbaum argued that the Kantian-based conception of criminal responsibil-
ity embraces a problematic mechanistic conception of emotion, under which 
emotions are
forces more or less devoid of thought or perception’ and ‘impulses or 
surges that lead [a] person to action without embodying beliefs, or any 
way of seeing the world that can be assessed as correct or incorrect, 
appropriate or inappropriate.14
On this view, emotions are external forces that cannot be educated, and must 
be tamed. Kahan and Nussbaum defended an alternative conception, which 
they referred to as the evaluative conception of emotion, under which emo-
tions ‘do embody beliefs and ways of seeing, which include appraisals or evalu-
ations of the importance or significance of objects or events’, which, in turn, 
can ‘be evaluated for their appropriateness or inappropriateness’.15
Contemporary work in moral psychology largely supports the evaluative 
conception, and shows that although we may experience the affective compo-
nent of emotions as if the emotions themselves are happening to us, mature 
emotional development consists in the ability to manage or regulate our emo-
tions.16 The development of emotion regulation (or emotional intelligence) 
is partly a function of neurological development17 and partly a function of 
12 Ibid., pp. 559–560. Moore is also a compatibilist, so even if emotions are external, they do 
not negate choice, ibid., pp. 553–554.
13 Ibid., and surrounding discussion in Moore’s text.
14 Kahan and Nussbaum, supra note 2, pp. 277–278.
15 Ibid., p. 278.
16 Benoit Monin, Jennifer S. Beer, and David A. Pizzaro, ‘Deciding Versus Reacting: Concep-
tions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate’, 11(2) Review of General Psychology 
(2007) 99–111.
17 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Macmillan, 
London, 1996).
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social development. 18 In addition, emotions influence our practical reasoning,19 
shape our moral perception, and thus aid (or impair) our decision-making.20 
Consequently, disruption to emotional development creates a risk of harm to 
a person’s practical reasoning ability21 and to his or her moral development.22
The Kantian-based version of the choice theory does not directly attend 
to the role that development plays in our becoming responsible beings in the 
world, or how certain experiences can deteriorate our agential capacities. 
Writing from an Aristotelian perspective, Jonathan Jacobs introduces the term 
‘coercive corruption’ to describe how certain environments can habituate a 
person toward vice, in a way that powerfully impacts his or her character devel-
opment.23 This idea is particularly relevant to the present discussion, insofar as 
the environments that are most ‘successful’ in habituating persons toward vice 
may also be those over which persons typically have the least control.
Imagine, for example, a young man, D, who, grew up enduring systematic 
coercion to commit criminal acts, was socialised by persons far more powerful 
than him into values radically at odds with those of law-abiding society, and 
kept isolated from anyone who could challenge D’s treatment without suffer-
ing serious harm. Suppose, further, that D’s formative adolescent years were 
spent learning how to stay alive through crime, and by the time he is a young 
adult, he has embraced crime as a way of life. Has D been coercively corrupted, 
or habituated by vice, making him inculpable for his present inclinations to-
wards criminality? Or does D consent to a criminal life? Does it matter that D 
comes from a ‘rotten social background’24 in judging whether he is criminally 
responsible for his adult crimes? If ‘perpetrators can experience their crimes as 
trauma’, that causes them ‘psychological injury… which can result in particular 
18 Laurence Steinberg, ‘Cognitive and affective development in adolescence’, 9(2) Trends in 
Cognitive Science (February 2008) 69–73.
19 Patricia Greenspan, ‘Practical Reasoning and Emotion’, in Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawl-
ing (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), 
pp. 206–221.
20 June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig, and Debra J. Mashek, ‘Moral Emotions and Moral Behav-
ior’, 58 Annual Review of Psychology (2007) 345–372.
21 Damasio, supra note 17.
22 Tagney et al., supra note 20.
23 Jonathan Jacobs, ‘Character, Punishment, and the Liberal Order’, in Alberto Masala and 
Jonathan Webber (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016), pp. 9–34.
24 Richard Delgado, ‘Rotten Social Background: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a De-
fense for Severe Environmental Deprivation’, 3(9) Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory 
and Practice (1985) 9–90.
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adverse physical, social, emotional consequences’,25 how would this develop-
mental fact matter to judging D’s adult culpability for criminal acts that no one 
coerced him to commit?
It has sometimes been held, and is often assumed, by proponents of the 
Kantian view, that persons are always responsible for their present characters, 
even if they have been exposed to traumatic experiences or corrupt moral 
teachings, because, at some point, they consented to becoming the persons 
they are.26 However, it is not always reasonable to expect persons to be ca-
pable of exercising the kind of reflective self-control that would allow them to 
evaluate their moral characters, revise them, and alter the ends their charac-
ters incline them to pursue. It may also be true, in some cases, that those most 
in need of revision to their moral characters are least able to perceive the need 
for revision, through no fault of their own.
Legal theorists have recently turned to virtue ethics to reconsider the role 
of character, the emotions, and moral development to criminal responsibility, 
and to use ideas from virtue ethics to make sense of difficult cases like D’s. 
Beginning with a brief discussion of Aristotelian ethics, I highlight the role of 
moral perception in ethical life, and how it can figure into a conception of 
criminal responsibility. Then, I lay out the harmed moral perception excuse, 
and, in the next section, I show there are compelling reasons to recognise it 
under international criminal law.27
For Aristotle, we are responsible for our voluntary actions, and our char-
acters, insofar as our characters are under our rational control and created 
through our voluntary actions.28 He recognised that none of us is fully respon-
sible for who we are, as habit formation and character development begin in 
25 Saira Mohamed, ‘Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass Atrocity’, 115(5) 
Columbia Law Review (2015) p. 1162.
26 Scanlon and Darwall embrace some version of this view. Scanlon holds that persons need 
the capacity to see the force of moral reasons in order to be fairly held responsible but 
carves out an exception for persons who simply ‘resist changing what they can’, in Thomas 
Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1998) pp. 282–283. Darwall accepts the description that psychopathy devel-
ops from ‘prior willful choices to reject the moral community’; Stephen Darwall, Second 
Personal Standpoint (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006) pp. 88–90.
27 There is a related literature on whether individual ignorance excuses for criminal and 
institutional wrongdoing, but as it typically takes a broader view of ignorance than I am 
concerned with in this article, I do not focus on it here. For an influential recent book, see 
Doug Husak’s Ignorance of Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2016).
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Terence Irwin, Second Edition (Hackett, India-
napolis, 1999), Book iii.
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youth when we lack practical reasoning. As practical reason develops, we 
acquire the ability to evaluate ends and select means to achieve them, but 
because our ability to do so is greatly influenced by our upbringing, Aristotle 
emphasised the importance of providing youth with good examples and in-
stilling proper habits through practice.
While Aristotle believed that virtue and vice are both voluntary, and that 
we are justly held responsible for our characters where they are developed 
through our voluntary actions, he does acknowledge that some people be-
come morbid or brutal by habituation, such as those who have been abused 
since childhood, and that such persons are ‘outside the limits of vice’.29 Here, 
Aristotle gestures to the idea that some people are not justly held responsible 
for their characters, insofar as it is unreasonable to say that their characters 
were formed through voluntary actions.30 This, I think, is similar to the kind of 
coercive corruption to which Jacobs refers, and highlights the fact that we are 
social animals, just as much as rational ones.31 As social animals, we develop 
our habits, which constitute our characters, not alone, but through our experi-
ences with others.
Aristotle attends closely to the formation of habits of action and feeling in 
his ethical writings, in recognition that these habits shape how we perceive the 
world. Eve Rabinoff has argued in a recent book that, for Aristotle, perception 
is the key to virtue, and that perception is equipped to discern morally salient 
particulars in one’s circumstances.32 In a passage that echoes recent findings 
in moral psychology on the importance of emotions to acting morally, Rabi-
noff writes:
Being fully prepared to act virtuously by having all the principles and be-
ing able to enact them just is not the same as actually acting virtuously; 
knowing what to do is not the same thing as doing it, and what makes 
the difference must come from the perception of particular, present 
circumstances.33
29 Aristotle, supra note 28, Book vii, Chapter 4, 1149a.
30 Perhaps in the case of the morbid or brutal by habituation who are coerced into vice, such 
persons formed their characters through what Aristotle calls ‘mixed actions’, which are 
part voluntary, as they are chosen, but part involuntary, insofar as no one would choose 
them for their own sakes. Ibid. Book iii, Chapter 1, 1113a-1135b.
31 Jacobs makes a similar point about our dual social and rational nature, supra note 23.
32 Rabinoff, supra note 1.
33 Ibid., p. 6.
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Rabinoff connects her reflections on ethical perception in Aristotle with re-
cent work by Lawrence Blum, who also maintained that: ‘[o]ne’s moral behav-
ior does not issue simply from one’s rational reflection upon it, but importantly 
from one’s sensitivity and way of responding perceptually and emotionally to 
one’s particular circumstances’.34 For Blum, moral perception plays a key role 
in our ability to choose to do the right thing, as it bridges the gap from abstract 
moral rules or principles to particular situations, and allows us to see ourselves 
living in a moral world where abstract moral rules and principles apply to the 
messy affairs of real life.35
Martha Nussbaum, John Gardner, Kyron Huigens, and Peter Arenella have 
each put forth accounts of criminal responsibility that draw on some of the 
central ideas of Aristotle’s ethics, in explaining, for instance, the importance 
of emotions and character development to questions of culpability.36 Among 
them, Arenella’s is the most relevant for my purposes here. The basic idea of 
Arenella’s view is that the capacity and fair opportunity to choose to obey the 
law includes not only practical reasoning ability, but also a basic moral com-
petence that allows persons to grasp, perceive, and act on the moral (and not 
simply the prudential) reasons for choosing to obey the law, as well as the fair 
opportunity to develop practical reason and this moral competence.37
Arenella develops a kind of choice theory that is anchored in a character 
conception of moral agency, under which choice is the intentional object of 
liability, but where the opportunity to develop a certain kind of character is a 
condition of criminally responsible agency. He argues that, because the crimi-
nal law derives a large part of its force from moral norms, persons who lack the 
capacity or fair opportunity to choose to obey the law for moral reasons are 
34 Ibid., p. 9.
35 Blum, supra note 1; see also Lawrence Blum, ‘Moral Perception and Particularity’, Ethics 101 
(1991) 701–725.
36 Supra note 2.
37 Arenella, supra note 2; see also Antony Duff, ‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We 
Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?’, 6(1) Buffalo Law Review (April 2002) 147–184. Similar 
to Arenella, Antony Duff argues that criminally responsible choice requires the norma-
tive capacities of a reasonable person to have a proper regard for the law and the values it 
protects, though he rejects the idea that we want an Aristotelian criminal law. Duff offers 
several reasons for this, though most are aimed at the kind of character-based theory of 
criminal responsibility put forth by Michael Bayles, which makes character the inten-
tional objects of liability. Because Arenella’s view makes choice the intentional object of 
liability, this objection does not apply to his view. In a reply article to Duff, Kyron Huigens 
also argues that Duff ’s view is more consistent with an Aristotelian view than he sup-
poses. See Huigens, supra note 2.
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at an unfair disadvantage in knowing what their obligations are, and in their 
ability to make the choice to fulfil them. Arenella refers to the basic moral com-
petence required for criminally responsible choice as ‘moral responsiveness’.38 
and it includes the following set of capacities: the capacity to cognitively grasp 
the moral norms that support the law’s prohibitions, the capacity to exercise 
moral judgment about how those norms apply to particular contexts (or, what 
I call moral perception), and the motivational capacity to use the applicable 
norms as a basis for acting.
Furthermore, Arenella argues that unless a person has been provided so-
cially created opportunities to develop these capacities, which he or she was 
genuinely capable of taking advantage of, it is not a culpable failure if a per-
son has not developed these capacities on his or her own. One’s background is 
not itself an excusing condition, but one’s background can, for example, help 
mould a person’s character in a way that deprives him or her of the capacity or 
fair opportunity to perceive where the moral norms that support the criminal 
law apply in particular situations. And, insofar as the criminal law is held to 
derive a large part of its force from morality, the capacity to perceive where 
the moral norms that support the criminal law apply in particular situations is 
required for persons to have a fair opportunity to choose to obey it. This means 
that persons who, through no fault of their own, have a substantial limitation 
to their capacity to perceive where the moral norms that support the law apply 
in particular situations, have been deprived of the fair opportunity to choose 
to obey the law. I call this the harmed this the harmed moral perception ex-
cuse. As both the Kantian and Aristotelian camps agree, persons who break 
the law, but who have been deprived of the fair opportunity to choose to obey 
it, warrant an excuse from criminal responsibility.
3 Defending the Quasi-Aristotelian Conception under International 
Criminal Law
A supporter of the Kantian-based conception of the choice theory could ob-
ject, however, to the quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility 
and excuse laid out above, on the grounds that the capacity of practical reason 
is sufficient to provide persons the fair opportunity to choose to obey the law, 
thus making moral capacities largely irrelevant. As such, she might draw on 
basic ideas of legal positivism to argue that laws are social rules, whose valid-
ity rests on social facts, not morality. She might add that, while some people 
38 Arenella, supra note 2, p. 82.
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may choose to obey the law because they perceive the moral force of the law, 
the existence of valid law itself provides people with sufficient (or at least suf-
ficiently strong) prudential reasons for action, thus rendering moral reasons 
unnecessary.
In this section, I respond to this objection by examining it in relation to 
international criminal law. My aim is to show that the underlying logic of the 
objection rests on sociological and philosophical assumptions about the con-
text and nature of law that do not account for salient features of international 
criminal law, which undermines the force of the objection in the context of 
international law. My argument proceeds in two parts. First, I focus on the con-
text in which international criminal law operates. Secondly, I focus on the na-
ture of international crimes. A main implication of my argument is that, given 
the extraordinary environments in which international crimes typically occur, 
and the moral nature of international crimes, there is a strong case for the 
quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility, and the harmed mor-
al perception excuse that is derived from it, under international criminal law.
The influential legal positivist, H.L.A. Hart, argued that, in a legal system, 
citizens typically follow the law because they accept the rules of the system.39 
This acceptance follows from the fact that the law supports the basic order of 
society, and with respect the criminal law, the fact that disobedience is typi-
cally met with sanction. In a functioning legal system, where established legal 
institutions maintain order through a largely settled and generally accepted 
system of rules, it is reasonable to expect most persons in society, most of the 
time, to conform their conduct to the basic rules of the criminal law without 
reflecting (morally) on it.40
Even a positivist can agree, however, that the environments in which inter-
national crimes typically occur are more forcibly limited and hostile than the 
environments in which domestic crimes typically occur.41 Implicit recognition 
39 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1961).
40 In this sense, people develop a sort of habitual obedience to the law, even if the idea of 
continuing habit cannot account for the concept of following a rule. Hart argues that 
our legal obligations do not exhaust our obligations: our legal obligations to obey unjust 
laws can be trumped by our moral obligations to disobey them. For this point, see H.L.A. 
Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, 71(4) Harvard Law Review (1958) 
593–629.
41 Perhaps the closest domestic parallel in a domestic legal system is the environment cre-
ated by some extreme gangs, where the ‘law of the street’ rather than the criminal law are 
the accepted rules of the game, so to speak. Even so, gangs are typically not nearly as iso-
lated from the wider realms of law-abiding society as are the armed groups in Africa that 
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of these differences is built into the Rome Statute, which is the treaty that cre-
ated the International Criminal Court (icc or Court) and serves as its govern-
ing body of law. The icc only acquires jurisdiction over cases where states are 
unable or unwilling to prosecute the crimes themselves.42 This means that the 
crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the icc occur in states that are failing 
in some fundamental way, by carrying out the crimes themselves, being com-
plicit in them, or by failing to prosecute them.43
Moreover, because the icc is designed with complementary jurisdiction 
to states, 44 this body of international criminal law operates more directly in 
the affairs of states than in the lives of ordinary people.45 Relative to the role 
played by the threat and fear of sanction over the lives of ordinary citizens in 
a functioning state, the role played by the threat and fear of sanction under 
international criminal law is much weaker. States operate as intermediaries 
between the icc and ordinary people, making the expectable benefits the icc 
can offer, and the expectable burdens it can impose, more certain and immedi-
ate for states than for individuals.
The icc has jurisdiction over the ‘most serious crimes that concern the in-
ternational community as a whole’.46 which has been interpreted to empower 
the Court to prosecute those most responsible for atrocities, and to target the 
highest-ranking perpetrators for prosecution.47 Yet, the highest-ranking perpe-
trators typically have considerable power that insulates them from the actual 
are the subject of many icc investigations, and this isolation is relevant to our culpability 
judgments.
42 Rome Statute, Article 17.
43 For a discussion on the ethics of lawfare and whether the first two icc were instances of 
lawfare, see K.J. Fisher and C.G. Stefan, ‘The Ethics of International Criminal ‘Lawfare’, 
16(2) International Criminal Law Review (2016) 237–257.
44 The Preamble to the Rome Statute ‘[e]mphasiz[es] that the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’.
45 My ideas here have been influenced by Allan Buchanan’s recent criticism of the attempt 
by John Tasioulas to offer a Razian account of international law. See Allan Buchanan, ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Law’, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Phi-
losophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), pp. 79–96; see also 
John Tasioulas, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds.), ibid., 
pp. 97–116 (emphasis added in text).
46 Rome Statute, Preamble.
47 The question of rank has been considered an issue of admissibility at the icc. Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute identifies requirements on admissibility at the icc. Article 17(d) articu-
lates the requirement that a case be deemed inadmissibility if ‘it is not of sufficient gravity 
to justify further action by the Court’. Questions have been raised about the importance of 
a perpetrator’s rank to the gravity threshold. For a discussion of the relevant jurisprudence, 
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reach of the Court.48 Some say that this explains why the icc has prosecuted 
leaders of rebel groups for international crimes, who typically have less power 
than state officials.49
While lower-ranking perpetrators may be more affected by the threat of 
sanction by the Court than high-ranking perpetrators, it is unlikely that the 
threat of sanction at the icc offers greater deterrent value (and thus pruden-
tial reason for action) than the threats these individuals face for disobeying 
their superiors, or the expected costs to their security in relinquishing violence 
as a means of protection and power. The Rome Statute identifies 30 years as a 
maximum sentence pursuant to a conviction, absent exceptional circumstanc-
es. The first defendant convicted at the icc, Congolese war criminal Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, received a sentence of 14 years.50 Other sentences imposed by 
the Court have been similar. If we compare these sentences with the fact that 
disobedience of one’s superiors inside the extreme armed groups in Africa that 
have been the subject of some icc investigations is typically met with credible 
and imminent harm to one’s bodily security or even death, the prospects of 
classical deterrence through the icc are weak. A person facing credible and 
imminent threats of death or serious bodily harm for disobedience is unlikely 
to see the uncertain threat of a less severe sanction from a distant court in The 
Hague as offering prudential reason to choose to obey the law, assuming he or 
she even knows what the law is.
Because the prudential reasons to choose to obey the law are so weak under 
international law, perhaps a positivist could agree that the capacity to perceive 
the moral reasons to choose to obey the law are more important under this 
body of law. Of course, a positivist may respond that the foregoing argument 
about the weaker deterrent force of international criminal law indirectly sup-
ports the argument that we need better enforcement of international criminal 
law, rather than more excuses from it. A positivist could contend that, through 
see Metgumi Ochi, ‘Gravity Threshold before the International Criminal Court: An Over-
view of the Court’s Practice’, International Crimes Database, icd Brief (January 2016).
48 Consider, for example, President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, who was indicted for orches-
trating genocide in Darfur by the icc pursuant to a United Nations Security Council re-
ferral. Because of his power and influence, al-Bashir remains at large. Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. icc-02/05-01/09.
49 This has sometimes been said of the icc’s first case against Congolese war criminal, 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. See William A. Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Ac-
tivism at the International Criminal Court’, 6(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2008) 731–761; and Margaret M. deGuzman, ‘Gravity and the Legitimacy of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’, Fordham International Law Journal (2009) 1400–1465.
50 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. icc-01/04-01/06.
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more certain and severe sanctions, international criminal law has a better 
chance of becoming accepted and established, and through better enforce-
ment, it can provide strong prudential reasons to conform one’s conduct to it.
Yet, this argument is problematic for two reasons. First, this approach could 
complicate the complementarity regime upon which the Court is built. While 
a functioning domestic legal system provides deterrent value by threatening 
and imposing classically coercive sanctions, the icc is designed as a court of 
last resort, which means that a high number of icc convictions would not 
necessarily signal that the Court is fulfilling its mandate to end impunity for 
mass atrocities. Rather, the adoption of the Rome Statute itself—in whole or 
part—into domestic legal systems would better illustrate this result, as it 
would show that states are taking seriously their primary responsibility to pre-
vent atrocities within their borders.51 In a systematic analysis of the deterrent 
capacity of the icc, Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe argue that the 
Court’s traditional deterrent capacity is weak, but they conclude that this does 
not undermine the Court’s mission or value, as the Court’s direct contribu-
tions to deterrence may be primarily symbolic.52 The icc’s expressive capacity 
can allow the icc to serve as a check on states, and indirectly contribute to 
deterrence.53
Secondly, the Court risks delegitimising itself if it lacks integrity between 
its practices and the moral norms upon which its authority depends. If the 
icc seeks to establish itself coercively, then it puts a stamp of approval on 
this sort of conduct for states. David Luban has argued that the primary pur-
pose of international criminal law is to project norms,54 and this means that 
the practices that the Court develops will set standards for the international 
community. Because of the close connection between law and morality on the 
51 Lisa J. Laplante, ‘The Domestication of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Ex-
panding the International Criminal Court’s Sphere of Influence’, 43 John Marshall Law 
Review (2010) 635–680.
52 Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, ‘The Ability of the International Criminal 
Court to Deter Violations of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment’, 10(5) 
International Criminal Law Review (2010) 771–786.
53 Nidal Nabil Jurdi makes a similar point, that the ‘complementarity regime of the icc can 
contribute to the creation of an effective indirect enforcement mechanism among state 
parties to the Rome Statute on a systematic basis’, although writing in 2010, he found 
the practice of the icc falling short of the goal. See Nidal Nabil Jurdi, ‘The Prosecutorial 
Interpretation of the Complementarity Principle: Does it Really Contribute to Ending Im-
punity on the National Level?’, 10 International Criminal Law Review (2010) 73–96.
54 David Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of Interna-
tional Criminal Law’, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds.), supra note 45, pp. 569–588.
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international level, the icc has a duty to uphold moral norms that establish its 
legal authority. With this in view, I now turn to the second part of this section, 
where I show that the moral nature of international crimes further strengthens 
the case for the quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility and 
excuse, and for the harmed moral perception excuse that is supported by it.
It is generally agreed that international criminal law derives from jus cogens 
norms, which are universally binding, regardless of whether they have been 
given explicit consent.55 Jus cogens is Latin for ‘compelling law’, meaning that 
these norms have a sort of super-status, which are held to give rise to obliga-
tions erga omnes, which is Latin for ‘flowing to all’. One example of a jus co-
gens norm is the prohibition on the wanton killing of innocents. While states 
and legal scholars debate the content and scope of jus cogens norms, there is 
consensus that they protect fundamental values from which no derogation is 
permitted. This view has been embraced by United Nations General Assembly, 
and, in 2015, was expressed by the Special Rapporteur as follows: ‘[n]orms of 
jus cogens protect fundamental values of the international community, are hi-
erarchically superior to other norms of international law and are universally 
applicable’.56 In a similar vein, William Schabas writes that:
The idea that there is some common denominator of behaviour, even in 
the most extreme circumstances of brutal armed conflict, confirms be-
liefs drawn from philosophy and religion about some of the fundamental 
values of the human spirit.57
The sphere of conduct that the Rome Statute identifies as criminal, and espe-
cially crimes against humanity and genocide, derives its force from the binding 
nature of jus cogens norms. In light of this, Ronald Dworkin has argued that the 
Rome Statute is binding by virtue of its moral force, rather than by the state 
consent that formed it.58 While a positivist might not be willing to say that the 
validity of the Rome Statute derives from the moral force of jus cogens norms 
55 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’, 59(4) 
Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) 63–74.
56 See Draft Conclusion 3, <legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2016/english/chp9.pdf>, accessed 8 Feb-
ruary 2019.
57 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 5th ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2017), p. 1.
58 Ronald Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy for International Law’, 41(1) Philosophy & Public Af-
fairs (2013) 20.
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rather than social facts, she could acknowledge that the content of the Statute 
includes such norms.
‘Inclusive legal positivists’ acknowledge that morality can be written into 
the content of the law.59 Article 33 of the Rome Statute is one example of a 
provision that has been interpreted to have moral content, and it a provision 
that is particularly relevant here. This is because Article 33’s ‘manifest illegality 
provision’ provides a legal basis for thinking that a basic kind of moral per-
ception is an implicit requirement of criminally responsible agency under the 
Statute. Article 33 states:
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been com-
mitted by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, 
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal re-
sponsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Gov-
ernment or the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful.60
Despite the absence of explicit moral language in the Rome Statute’s version of 
the doctrine, the italicised portion implies that those under its jurisdiction are 
capable of perceiving where basic moral norms that support the prohibitions 
on genocide and crimes against humanity apply in practice, in accordance with 
internationally accepted standards of morality. Similarly, Larry May has argued 
that: ‘ascertaining what is manifest requires the use of moral perception’,61 and 
Mark Osiel also maintains:
The doctrine of manifest illegality… rests on the assumption that every 
reasonable person possesses a moral sense, endowed by nature or in-
stilled by society, enabling him to identify egregiously wicked conduct 
as such. The law makes no sense, in other words, unless conventional 
59 Wilfrid Waluchow, ‘Legal positivism, inclusive versus exclusive’, in E. Craig (ed.), Rout-
ledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, London, 2001).
60 Rome Statute, Article 33 (emphasis added). For my argument that this applies a fortiori 
to conduct that constitutes crimes against humanity and genocide, that no one ordered a 
person to commit, see Renée Nicole Souris, ‘Child soldiering on trial: An interdisciplinary 
analysis of responsibility in the Lord’s Resistance Army’, 13(3) International Journal of Law 
in Context (2017) 316–335.
61 Larry May, Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005), p. 197.
0004362067.INDD   16 10-04-2019   20:54:35
 17Virtue Ethics, Criminal Responsibility, And Dominic Ongwen
international criminal law review 19 (2019) 1-30
204346
morality is sufficient to enable the person of ordinary understanding to 
identify radically evil orders as just that. To stress the fragility of conven-
tional morality is therefore to shake the foundations of the manifest il-
legality rule.62
The manifest illegality provision provides legal basis, within the Rome Statute, 
for thinking that basic moral perception is required for criminally responsible 
agency under this body of law.
In the end, inclusive legal positivists can acknowledge that law and moral-
ity are bound up with one another under international criminal, and that an 
implication of this is that persons need some basic moral perception to be ca-
pable of perceiving the moral norms that give force to legal prohibitions under 
this body of law. In light of this, perhaps a positivist, and a proponent of the 
Kantian-based version of the choice theory, could be persuaded to embrace 
the harmed moral perception excuse that I laid out above at the end of Sec-
tion 2, and elaborate on below, at least as applied to international criminal law.
Insofar as the icc expresses a moral voice of the international community, 
it represents the community of people, communities, and states who have a 
basic shared perception of where jus cogens norms apply in practice. Even 
if states and legal scholars debate the content and scope of these norms, the 
Rome Statute manifest illegality provision identifies prohibitions on crimes 
against humanity and genocide as non-derogable, and therefore as having the 
status of jus cogens norms for the purposes of the Statute. Because the mani-
fest illegality provision implicitly creates the requirement that persons under 
the icc’s jurisdiction need the capacity to perceive where these norms apply 
in particular situations to be capable of criminally responsible choice under 
Statute, and the fact moral perception is constitutive of one’s basic moral char-
acter, the icc is necessarily concerned with the basic moral characters of per-
sons under its jurisdiction.63
So, what constitutive part of a person’s moral character allows him or her to 
be capable of perceiving where the basic moral norms of international criminal 
62 Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt: Criminal Consciousness in 
Argentina’s Dirty War (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2001), p. 151.
63 One reason Antony Duff, supra note 37, has argued that we do not want an Aristotelian 
criminal law is based on the view that it is not properly the business of the liberal state 
to evaluate persons’ characters. Jonathan Jacobs argues in response that the liberal pol-
ity crucially depends on certain basic character traits being widespread, supra note 23. 
My analysis here seeks to show that Jacob’s point applies a fortiori to the international 
community.
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law apply in practice? I put forth ‘ordinary moral perception’ as the capacity 
that equips a person with this ability. As noted in the previous section, moral 
perception bridges the gap from abstract moral rules or principles to particular 
situations, and allows us to see ourselves living in a moral world where abstract 
moral rules and principles apply to the messy affairs of real life.64 Ordinary 
moral perception, as I construe it, is simply the capacity to perceive where the 
most basic moral norms (or jus cogens norms) apply. Consider, again, the wan-
ton killing of innocent civilians, which is a crime against humanity if carried 
out as a part of a widespread and systematic attack.65 Having ordinary moral 
perception, or the moral perception of which an ordinary person is capable, 
would allow a person to see such instances as wrong, and as manifestly unlaw-
ful, in particular situations.66
If ordinary moral perception is needed to perceive where moral norms of 
international criminal law apply in concrete cases, then someone who suffers 
from a substantial non-culpable impairment to this capacity, while inside the 
forcibly limited and hostile environment of armed conflict, where the pru-
dential reasons to choose to obey the law are considerably weak, cannot rea-
sonably be expected to perceive the wrongfulness of the sphere of conduct 
deemed criminal under international criminal law. In such a case, I argue that 
a person warrants an excuse from criminal responsibility, on the grounds that 
he or she was deprived of the fair opportunity to choose to obey the law. This 
is the basis idea of the harmed moral perception excuse, and in the next sec-
tion, I identify four conditions for the application of this excuse to a particular 
case, and then I examine a plausible case currently at the icc, where it might 
be applied.
4 Applying the Harmed Moral Perception Excuse under International 
Criminal Law
There are four conditions required to trigger the harmed moral perception 
excuse:
I. A person has a substantially limited capacity for ordinary moral percep-
tion, as a result of environmentally induced defective moral development.
64 Blum, supra notes 1 and 35.
65 Rome Statute, Article 7.
66 Simply knowing that others think that certain conduct is wrong is not moral perception 
as such, though it would be enough (in most circumstances) for a person to know that the 
behaviour is considered manifestly unlawful.
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II. The person cannot reasonably be held to have culpably contributed to 
having this agential defect to his or her moral perception, insofar as the 
conditions under which it developed are recognised as excusing condi-
tions under the law.
III. He or she cannot reasonably have been expected to revise this defect be-
fore the time of action, due to having been in circumstances that greatly 
burden the ability to do so.
IV. It must be reasonable to regard the person’s wrongful conduct as the re-
sult of the inability to see the conduct as wrong.
Where these conditions are met, a person has been deprived of the fair oppor-
tunity to choose to obey the law, and thereby warrants an excuse from criminal 
responsibility for violating it. So, what sort of case, then, would plausibly impli-
cate the harmed moral perception excuse?
Consider the case of Dominic Ongwen, who is currently facing icc prosecu-
tion for 70 counts of international crimes. Ongwen is a former leader of the 
notorious armed group from Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (lra).67 He 
is accused of 70 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, includ-
ing: directing attacks against the civilian population, murder, torture, cruel 
treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, forced marriage, rape, torture, and 
sexual slavery.68 On the surface, Ongwen is an archetypal candidate for blame. 
He rose through the ranks of the lra to become a Brigade Commander of one 
of the lra’s most destructive units. Yet, upon reflection, Ongwen’s story is far 
more complex.
Ongwen not only is the youngest individual and lowest-ranking individual 
indicted by the icc, but he is also the only person indicted by the Court for the 
same crimes of which he was a victim.69 Sometime between the ages of nine-
and-a-half and 13 years old, Ongwen was abducted by the lra on his way to 
school.70 Abduction is typical for the lra, and the group often uses a method 
67 For related inquiries into Ongwen’s culpability, see Erin K. Baines, ‘Complex political per-
petrators: reflections on Dominic Ongwen’, 47 Journal of Modern African Studies (2009) 
163–191; Windell Nortje, ‘Victim or villain: Exploring the possible bases of a defence in the 
Ongwen case at the International Criminal Court’, 17(1) International Criminal Law Review 
(2017) 186–207; Mark Drumbl, ‘Victims who Victimise’, 4 London Review of International 
Law (2016) 217–246.
68 ‘Accused crimes (Non-exhaustive list)’, International Criminal Court website, <www.icc-
cpi.int/uganda/ongwen/pages/alleged-crimes.aspx>, accessed 8 February 2019.
69 See Baines, supra note 67.
70 Ongwen’s defence identifies nine and a half as his age of abduction, whereas the pros-
ecution identifies twelve to thirteen. Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. icc-02/04–
01/15, Confirmation of Charges, p. 3, paras. 11–13 (26 January 2016).
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known as ‘press-ganging’, which is a ‘form of group abduction wherein soldiers 
sweep through marketplaces or streets rounding up youths like fish in nets, or 
raid institutions such as orphanages or schools’.71 After Ongwen’s abduction, 
he was placed under the tutelage of lra leader, Vincent Otti, and trained to 
be a child soldier. While public information about Ongwen’s specific experi-
ences in the lra is limited, typical experiences of lra child soldiers are well 
documented, which allows us to understand what it is reasonable to expect 
Ongwen experienced.
During or soon after recruitment, lra child soldiers endure initiation rituals 
where new recruits are forced to publicly kill a friend or family member under 
credible threat of immediate execution.72 This is done in public so newly ab-
ducted children witness other children refuse and be immediately executed or 
kill an innocent person and save their lives. After the initial steps of initiation, 
some children are then coerced to drink the blood of their deceased victims or 
hack their bodies to pieces, to desensitise them to the violence and brutality 
that will soon become the norm in their lives. Again, children who refuse suffer 
severe punishment, and even death.
Leaders then mutilate the bodies of new recruits in visible ways, on the face, 
for example, to create stigmatic markers that they are now members of the 
lra. Practices such as these serve to morally sever child soldiers from their 
previous lives, before physically separating from their any semblance of or-
dinary society. After initiation, the lra brings children into the ‘bush’, or the 
isolated jungle, for training, which consists of rigid physical and psychological 
tests that are met with severe penalties for refusing to participate or showing 
signs of weakness and sadness.
Moving from recruitment to modes of retention, ethnographic studies re-
count that many former lra child soldiers explain that they had learned to 
follow the rules or consent to being killed.73 To prevent child recruits from es-
caping, the lra is known to put children into a chain gang, using a chain made 
from barbed wire, so that the children would need to cut through their own 
limbs in order to get free.74 Other children are killed by the lra while trying 
71 Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 2006), p. 41.
72 Ibid., p. 14.
73 Opiyo Oloya, Child to Soldier: Stories from Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (University 
of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013).
74 pbs Documentary, The Reckoning: The Battle for the International Criminal Court (Skylight 
Pictures, 2009).
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to escape, and many die during raids of villages or clashes with government 
forces.
Children who survive are subjected to a strict regime of training. Like ordi-
nary soldiers, lra child soldiers are put in uniforms and given war names but, 
unlike ordinary soldiers, among whom camaraderie is encouraged, lra lead-
ers deliberately undermine the formation of trust among new child recruits. To 
achieve this, the lra institutes a policy where ‘talking with other new recruits 
is a punishable offense’.75 Michael Wessells explains that training aims to break 
the children’s wills: ‘[t]ypically the training agenda is not to develop military 
or survival skills but to break children’s will and to achieve high levels of domi-
nance and control’.76 He adds that:
Children are pliable in that they are flexible and easily manipulated and 
controlled. Young children are controllable through terror and brutal-
ity, a point not lost on older, stronger, and more cunning commanders. 
Through violence or threat of violence, young children can be trained to 
obey commands that many adults would contest or find ways around.77
One of the most brutal, systematic, and enduring tactics used by lra leaders 
in their quest to coercively indoctrinate child soldiers into the values of the 
group is that they reward wanton acts of violence against innocents, and pun-
ish expressions of sadness, sympathy or compassion at the suffering of others.
The isolation and deliberate undermining of trust, combined with the bru-
tal punishments and psychologically invasive forms of socialisation and in-
doctrination, can explain how children who enter the lra unwillingly later 
become willing participants in the groups’ activities. According to Wessells, 
‘Children who grow up having learned fighting as their only means of liveli-
hood and survival are likely to continue fighting for more years than adults’.78 
One lra commander explained in an interview that this is part of the lra’s 
plan, as children make better soldiers than adults:
It was easy to make the newly abducted children participate with us. We 
taught them to become loyal and do what we said. They listened. This was 
difficult with grown-ups; we could not change their minds easily. They 
75 Wessells, supra note 71, p. 63.
76 Ibid., p. 58.
77 Ibid., p. 36.
78 Ibid., p. 30.
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were always thinking about going home to their families. It was much 
easier to make the children become good, integrated rebels.79
Not all children become good, integrated rebels, although many do. In describ-
ing the diversity of responses among child soldiers in extreme armed groups 
more generally, Wessells observes that:
Some child combatants fight reluctantly, kill only when necessary, and 
constantly look for escape opportunities, whereas others learn to enjoy 
combat and redefine their identities as soldiers. A small minority be-
come hardened perpetrators who relish the sight and smell of blood or 
initiate or participate willingly in atrocities that no one ordered them to 
commit.80
Counterintuitively, children who become hardened perpetrators and who par-
ticipate willingly in atrocities no one orders them to commit may, in fact, be 
the most harmed by their experiences.
In Pre-Trial proceedings in Ongwen’s case at the icc, his defence team has 
argued that Ongwen should have his criminal responsibility excluded on the 
grounds that, from the time he was abducted until the time he surrendered, his 
status remained that of a child soldier under 15, and a victim, under interna-
tional criminal law. The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this argument:
The Defence has raised several times an argument that circumstances 
exist that exclude Dominic Ongwen’s individual criminal responsibility 
for the crimes that he may otherwise have committed. One side of this 
argument is that Dominic Ongwen, who was abducted into the lra in 
1987 at a young age and made a child soldier, should benefit from the 
international legal protection as child soldier up to the moment of his 
leaving of the lra in January 2015, almost 30 years after his abduction, 
and that such protection should include, as a matter of law, an exclusion 
of individual criminal responsibility for the crimes under the Statute that 
79 Scott Gates, ‘Why Do Children Fight: Motivations and the Mode of Recruitment’, in A. 
Özerdem and S. Podder (eds.), Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration (Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2011), p. 45.
80 Wessells, supra note 71, p. 74.
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he may have committed. However, this argument is entirely without legal 
basis, and the Chamber will not entertain it further.81
The driving force behind the Pre-Trial Chamber’s rejection of the Defense’s 
argument is the lack of a clear legal nexus between Ongwen’s childhood vic-
timisation and his adult crimes.82 In what follows, I articulate a legal nexus 
between Ongwen’s background and his adult criminal conduct, in the course 
of illustrating a plausible application of the harmed moral perception excuse’s 
four necessary conditions to his case.
To begin applying condition I to Ongwen’s case, recent research in moral 
psychology shows that typical experiences of child soldiers in extreme armed 
groups like the lra create a substantial risk of harm to the adult development 
of moral agency, especially to the capacity of moral perception.83 Aristotle 
recognised what contemporary moral psychology now confirms: the habits of 
feeling that we develop during our youth become settled parts of our char-
acters as adults, and shape our adult moral perception. Indoctrination that 
involves rewards for wanton acts of violence and punishments for showing 
compassion at the suffering of others are precisely the kinds of experiences 
that create a substantial risk of harm to the developing child’s emotional de-
velopment, especially to the development of the moral emotions: guilt, shame, 
and empathy.84 Empirical work shows that child soldiers from extreme armed 
groups like the lra suffer severe emotional disturbance as a result of their 
experiences,85 and insofar as emotion influences moral perception,86 these 
81 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, supra note 70, Decision on the defence request for 
leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation of charges, 26 April 2016. para. 18.
82 See Nortje, supra note 67, pp. 11–12.
83 Souris, supra note 60.
84 Katz and Scheutz-Mueller describe this as a ‘hijacking’ of the moral development of child 
soldiers: Craig L. Katz and Jan Schuetz-Mueller, A Guide to Global Mental Health Practice: 
Seeing the Unseen (Routledge, New York, 2015), p. 99.
85 Kennedy Amone-P’Olak and Bernard Omech, ‘Coping with post-war mental health prob-
lems among survivors of violence in Northern Uganda: Findings from the ways study’, 
Journal of Health Psychology (2018), <doi.org/10.1177/1359105318775185>, accessed 8 Febru-
ary 2019. Research conducted with former child soldiers from the Revolutionary United 
Front (ruf), an armed group from Sierra Leone notorious for practices like the lra, finds 
strong indicators of emotional disturbances associated with ptsd from child soldiering. 
See Theresa Betancourt et al., ‘Sierra Leone’s former child soldiers: A longitudinal study of 
risk, protective factors, and mental health’, 49(6) Journal of the American Academy of Child 
& Adolescent Psychiatry (2010) 606–615.
86 Daniel Jacobson, ‘Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception’, 8(4) Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice (2005) 387–409.
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emotional disturbances create a substantial risk of harm to the adult capacity 
for ordinary moral perception. Therefore, an adult who spent his or her for-
mative adolescent years inside has likely developed environmentally induced 
defective moral development that manifests itself as a substantial limitation 
to his or her capacity for ordinary moral perception. This satisfies condition I 
noted above.
Moving to consider condition II, there are several reasons for thinking 
that someone who spent his or her formative years inside an extreme armed 
group like the lra, and who grows up with a substantial limitation to his or 
her capacity for ordinary moral perception, cannot be held to have culpably 
contributed to having this defect, based on existing standards in the law. First, 
Article 31 of the Rome Statute identifies duress87 as a full defense to criminal 
responsibility, and duress would provide a full defense for children under 15 
who kill innocents to save their own lives, as children are forced to do during 
initial rituals with the lra.88 The Statute further reflects the non-culpability of 
children under 15 by making the conscription or enlistment of children under 
15 for active participation in hostilities a war crime.89 This shows that children 
under 15 cannot exercise responsible choice to consent to participate in armed 
conflict under the Statute, and this presumption of non-responsibility would 
need to extend to conduct inside armed conflict carried out by children under 
15 for the Statute to be interpreted in a consistent way.
Secondly, there is reason to think that the best interpretation of the Rome 
Statute is one that regards the otherwise unlawful conduct of adolescents aged 
15–17 inside armed conflict as non-culpable. Article 31(3) of the Rome Statute 
states that the Court may derive grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
from the applicable law set forth in Article 21, which states that the Statute 
should be interpreted consistent with ‘applicable treaties and the principles 
and rules of international law’. There is good reason to recognise the age of 
eighteen as the age of criminal responsibility under international law. The 
icc only has jurisdiction over conduct performed after a person’s eighteenth 
birthday, and the age of 18 has been adopted as the minimum age of respon-
sibility in the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child 
(2000) and in the Paris Principles (2007), the latter of which has been endorsed 
by over 100 countries worldwide. Beyond doctrine, the view that adolescents 
aged 15–17 are non-culpable for conduct inside armed conflict is also reflected 
87 Rome Statute, Article 31(1)(d).
88 Matthew Happold, ‘Child Soldiers: Victim or Perpetrators’, 29 University of La Vern Law 
Review (2008) 56–87.
89 Rome Statute, Article 8(e)(7).
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in practice, as no international court has held persons under 18 criminally re-
sponsible for their participation in mass atrocities.
Thirdly, Article 31 of the Rome Statute broadens the scope of duress to in-
clude not only immediate threats by others, but also the ‘threat of imminent 
death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm’, where the threat one 
acts to avoid is either ‘made either by other persons’ or ‘constituted by other 
circumstances beyond that person’s control’. While there are other parts of the 
provision that must be satisfied for the defense to apply, which the Pre-Trial 
Chamber judges have rightly interpreted would not be satisfied in a case like 
Ongwen’s that involves the killing of innocents, the provision provides a legal 
basis for thinking both that certain kinds of environments unfairly burden a 
person’s agential capacities, and that one’s presence inside such environments 
may be largely beyond his or her control. Based on the specific formulation of 
duress in the Rome Statute, I argue there is legal basis for recognising the non-
culpability of the kind of defective moral development that can result from 
child soldering in an extreme armed group like the lra.
If, by the time Ongwen was a young adult, he had spent his formative years 
subject to episodic threats of death or serious bodily harm made by his su-
periors inside the lra, within the larger environment of armed conflict that 
poses continuing threats outside the group, then it is reasonable to say his cir-
cumstances were largely beyond his control. Moreover, even if he was no lon-
ger exposed to imminent threats from superiors for acting against the group’s 
interest, he might reasonably expect otherwise, or simply not want to take the 
risk by supposing that it is not. Depending upon the particular experiences 
to which Ongwen was subject, his practical reasoning and his perception of 
right and wrong may be so distorted that he may be substantially limited in his 
ability to calibrate risk and reward, and to see the wrongfulness of his conduct, 
through no fault of his own, insofar as the conditions under which these de-
fects developed are recognised as non-culpable under standards contained in 
the law. This, then, would satisfy condition II.
This brings us to condition iii. Because Ongwen remained in the forcibly 
limited and hostile environment of armed conflict into young adulthood, is it 
also reasonable to think that, by the time he was a young adult, he was substan-
tially limited in his capacity to exercise the kind of reflective self-control90 that 
would allow him to critically assess what he was taught, in light of moral rules 
and principles and abandon the strategies he learned to survive as a child. Even 
if he was not, in principle, completely incapable of perceiving how basic moral 
90 For more on reflective self-control, see R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and Moral Sentiments 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994).
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norms apply to his situation, it is reasonable to expect that his ability to do so 
would be substantially and unfairly diminished while in this environment. The 
environment of armed conflict is known to burden an ordinary person’s capac-
ity for moral perception and practical reasoning, making it unreasonable to 
expect a person with harm to these capacities to exercise the kind of reflective 
self-control that would be needed to revise his or her character. Because of the 
continuing threats facing Ongwen into his adulthood, and his substantially im-
paired capacities to make sense of these threats, he could not reasonably have 
been expected to revise the agential defects to his character, before the time of 
action at issue in his alleged crimes at the icc, thereby satisfying condition iii.
Moving, lastly, to condition IV, consider the fact that, until his surrender, 
Ongwen’s life was lived mostly in isolation in the African jungle, lacking so-
cialisation with people who were not also in the lra. If Ongwen grew up in 
an environment where those who challenged the values and practices of the 
lra were punished or killed, it is plausible that he may not ever have socialised 
with a person who expressed the wrongfulness of the atrocities the group is 
known to commit. Depending on the degree of his isolation from law-abiding 
society, combined with the invasiveness and depth of his indoctrination, it 
is possible that he may not have recognised that others consider his conduct 
wrongful, even as a matter of social fact.
Ongwen only came to question the lra when top lra leader, Joseph Kony, 
had Vincent Otti killed. To recall, Ongwen lived in Otti’s home during his time 
as a child soldier, and it is likely he came to see Otti as a gatekeeper of his se-
curity. If Ongwen regarded Otti’s murder as a threat to his own security, this 
could explain why, after years of embracing the lra, he came to question Kony 
and the lra. When Kony heard that Ongwen was considering leaving the lra, 
Kony had Ongwen detained and tortured.91 Ongwen was able to escape deten-
tion under Kony, after which he fled the lra and surrendered to a cattle herd-
er, who brought him to the nearby Seleka rebel group in the Central African 
Republic.92 Because Ongwen came to challenge the lra when his own security 
was at stake, it is reasonable to think that he did not perceive the wrongfulness 
of his conduct while inside the group, and if this is true, then it is reasonable to 
regard his wrongful conduct as the result of the inability to see the conduct as 
wrong, thereby satisfying condition IV.
Although Ongwen has been accused of gross atrocities, it is unclear that he 
is truly the kind of evil mastermind that the icc was designed to punish. What 
is clearer is that there is good reason to question Ongwen’s culpability, if his 
91 Nortje, supra note 67.
92 Ibid.
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developmental background was littered with the kinds of traumatic experi-
ences that are typical of lra child soldiers. If Ongwen, or persons like him, are 
substantially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral per-
ception, in environments where the prudential reasons to choose to obey the 
law are weak, and where the applicable legal rules derive their force from moral 
norms, they have been deprived of the fair opportunity to choose to obey the 
law. In such cases, persons warrant an excuse from criminal responsibility for 
prohibited conduct they performed under the specified limited conditions.93
5 Conclusion
In this article, I have contributed to the debate between two philosophical tra-
ditions—the Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal 
responsibility and the grounds for excuse by taking this debate to the context 
of international criminal law. After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian 
conceptions of criminal responsibility, I defended a quasi-Aristotelian con-
ception, which affords a central role to moral development, especially to the 
development of moral perception, for international criminal law. My defense 
relied on the environments in which international crimes typically occur, and 
the moral nature of international crimes.
Under the quasi-Aristotelian conception of criminal responsibility and ex-
cuse that I drew on in this article, a person is excused from criminal respon-
sibility if she lacked either the capacity or the fair opportunity to choose to 
obey the law, where this includes the capacity for practical reason, as well 
as certain moral capacities, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capaci-
ties. I then showed that an implication of this view is that certain forms of 
non-culpable defective moral development ground an excuse from criminal 
responsibility, and I introduced the harmed moral perception excuse as a par-
ticularly relevant excuse for international criminal law. From here, I identified 
four conditions that are needed for the excuse to apply and I examined the 
case of Dominic Ongwen currently at the icc as an example of where the ex-
cuse might apply. With this summary in view, I now offer a few concluding 
reflections based on my analysis.
93 I recognise that persons like Ongwen may be dangerous, and that incapacitation on utili-
tarian grounds may be morally justifiable. To embrace this is not to concede responsibility, 
but rather it is to recognise our obligations to protect innocent people. For incapacitation 
to be morally permissible, further conditions need to be met, including the minimum 
deprivation necessary, and the provision for rehabilitative support.
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For those who remain hesitant in excusing someone like Ongwen under the 
criminal law, Gary Watson offers a distinction between two kinds of blame that 
is helpful in making sense of tension we may have in this sort of case.94 Watson 
distinguishes between two ‘faces’ or kinds of responsibility: on the one hand, 
there is an aretaic or attributability face to our practices, where we judge oth-
ers, and are judged by them, in light of ‘ideals of human excellence,’ and, on the 
other hand, there is an accountability face, which deals with ‘social regulation’ 
and ‘retributive and compensatory justice’.95 While aretaic blame is appropri-
ately expressed toward defects in one’s character and is limited in its response 
to the expression of a negative attitude toward another person, accountability 
blame calls for something further—the imposition of sanction.
Because accountability blame calls for the imposition of sanction, it is con-
strained by principles of fairness, which require that sanctions are only im-
posed for conduct that persons could have reasonably been expected to avoid, 
and by someone with legitimate authority to impose the sanction, or to use 
Watson’s phrase, ‘someone authorized to the make the demand’.96 As the crim-
inal law has a monopoly on imposing legal sanction, and criminal courts are 
vested with the authority to impose sanctions, the criminal law is concerned 
with the accountability face of responsibility. Using the distinction between 
aretaic and accountability blame, Watson argues that we can judge a person to 
be defective in relation to ideals of human excellence and wish to express this 
judgment by expressing aretaic blame, even if we conclude that fairness ren-
ders the person unfit for accountability blame in the form of criminal sanction.
Aretaic blame is appropriate for character defects in an agent, against ide-
als of human excellence, and, obviously, persons like Ongwen are unworthy of 
emulation. This may perhaps be especially so, relative to the various children 
who sacrificed their lives in acts of disobedience to leaders who sought to coer-
cively mould them into pliant child soldiers. We might even wish to praise such 
children as courageous, or as standing up against injustice, if they refused to 
harm others to save their own lives, which is reasonable, as long as our praise 
does not develop into the highly problematic notion that children ought to 
sacrifice their lives in such circumstances.
By appreciating the two faces of responsibility for a case like Ongwen’s, 
we can begin to make sense of any internal tension that we may experience 
in our efforts to understand his case, and also the various, often conflicting, 
94 Gary Watson, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004).
95 Ibid., pp. 285–286.
96 Ibid., p. 276.
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judgments of those who knew him throughout his life. Actual victims of 
Ongwen have expressed a long list of reactive attitudes toward him, from anger 
and resentment for the pain he caused, to sympathy and even gratitude for 
the kindness and the mercy of which he, at times, seemed capable.97 The fact 
that Ongwen is capable of displaying episodes of mercy shows that his moral 
capacities are not entirely destroyed, but it does not show that, after all, he 
was capable of criminally responsible choice. A person’s capacity for ordinary 
moral perception does not have to be completely destroyed to warrant an ex-
cuse under the harmed moral perception excuse,98 but, rather, a reasonable 
expectation that a person’s capacity for ordinary perception was substantially 
and unfairly diminished at the time of action is sufficient.
Adults who were recruited into extreme armed groups as children, and who, 
as a result, suffer from substantial limitations to their capacity for ordinary 
moral perception, stand at the margins of the moral community, but they 
should be provided with socially created opportunities to move more fully into 
the moral community. Fieldwork on the re-integration of former child soldiers 
highlights the resilience of children and adolescents,99 but because most re-
habilitative programs exclude persons over 18 from access to their resources, 
adults who grew up as child soldiers are often neglected. Without support as 
they make the transition into their communities, and having spent their for-
mative years in armed conflict, many are vulnerable to recruitment by govern-
mental armies, and others who lack marketable skills turn to street crime to 
make a living.
The Rome Statute’s Preamble acknowledges that millions of children have 
been victims of ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’ and it refers the bonds between peoples and cultures as a ‘delicate 
mosaic’ that ‘may be shattered at any time’.100 Virtue ethics and contemporary 
moral psychology teach us that each child is also a delicate mosaic, who is 
vulnerable, just as much as he or she is resilient, and whose moral percep-
tion may be harmed by the unimaginable atrocities of child soldiering. Not 
97 Drumbl, supra note 67; see also Nortje, supra note 67, citing Baines, supra note 67, p. 175.
98 As would be required if he were to be excused under the mental disease and defect provi-
sion in Article 31(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which identifies, as a ground for exclusion 
of criminal responsibility that: ‘[t}he person suffers from a mental disease or defect that 
destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her con-
duct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law’ 
(emphasis added).
99 See Souris, supra note 60.
100 Rome Statute, Preamble.
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all child soldiers are traumatised by their experiences, but many are, and we 
should take seriously the reality that those who appear most hardened by their 
experiences may also be the most traumatised by them. Unless we do so, I 
worry that our efforts at ending impunity for atrocities will only contribute to 
more injustice.101
101 I would like to thank anonymous reviewers from the journal for the helpful comments on 
my article, as well as my friend and colleague Jeffrey Turner, for discussing the philosophi-
cal issues at stake in my argument.
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